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Religions best flourish when human rights are respected. And human
rights flourish best when religion respects them. "[Rieligion and human
rights need each other," in the view of Donald Shriver, President Emeri-
tus of the Union Theological Seminary.' The European Court of Human
Rights has recognized that freedom of religion is "one of the foundations
of a 'democratic society.' ,,2 To the extent that political communities can
contain religious differences while respecting human and constitutional
rights, religion helps to energize and enrich civil society and its delibera-
tions.3 Religious tolerance and pluralism made great gains in Western
Europe after World War II and in Eastern Europe after the Cold War. But
where these gains fall short of human rights standards on freedom of
religion and belief, religion often plays a part. Indeed, religions do not
all, or always, pray for the human rights of other religions. Religion is an
ambivalent force.4
* Peter Juviler is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Director of Human Rights
Studies at Barnard College, Adviser in the Columbia University Studies MA Program in Hu-
man Rights, and Chair of the Columbia University Seminar on Human Rights. Thanks to
Molly M. Manning for her contributions to this Review.
I. Donald W. Shriver, Religion and Human Rights: The Capacity to "Swear to One's
Own Hurt", in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE 511, 519 (Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds., 2002).
2. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 418 (1994).
3. See Gaylen J. Byker, The Religious and Moral Foundations of Civil Society and
Free Market Economy, 13 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY STUD. 1 (2001); Anna Greenberg, The
Church and the Revitalization of Politics and Community, 115 POL. SCl. Q. 377 (2000).
4. See Jimmy Carter, Preface to RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, at ix, ix (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996) (noting
that "religion can be such a powerful force for good and evil..."); Desmond M. Tutu, Preface
to RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, at ix, xiii
(John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996) (noting that religion "is not often in and
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Rights to freedom of religion and belief are spelled out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,5 the United Nations (U.N.)
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief,6 and in both U.N. and
regional treaties. For example, article 9, part 1 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which is
almost identical to the provision in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, affirms that
[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or be-
lief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.7
The pioneering 1959 report of the first U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Religion and Human Rights, Arcot Krishnaswami, recognized the prob-
lems for these rights posed by their purported holders, religions
themselves. Krishnaswami began his report with a contrast between the
religious ethics of human mutuality and the "horrors and excesses ...
committed in the name of religion or belief."8 Minority religions provoke
ostracism and outright discrimination, sometimes even violence, espe-
cially when the new groups proselytize.9 Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen
reached similar conclusions thirty-six years later in their world survey of
religious freedom.'° A year before that, similar indications appeared in
the symposium on Religious Diversity and Human Rights compiled by
Irene Bloom and colleagues," and the two-volume compendium, Reli-
gious Human Rights in Global Perspective, edited out of the Emory
of itself necessarily a good thing"); Peter Juviler, Ambiguities of the Divine, in RELIGION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 3 (Carrie Gustafson & Peter Juviler eds., 1999).
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Supp. No. 13, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
6. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36155, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171,
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 9(l), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
8. ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES 8 (1959).
9. Id. at 35.
10. See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT (Kevin Boyle & Juliet
Sheen eds., 1997).
11. See RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Irene Bloom et al. eds., 1996).
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University Law School Program on Religion and Law.' 2 Its co-editor,
John Witte, head of the Emory program, a friend rather than foe of relig-
ion, writes that religious organizations' "internal policies and external
advocacy have helped to perpetuate bigotry, chauvinism, and violence as
much [as] they have served to propagate equality, liberty, and frater-
nity." 
3
When religion becomes a marker of ethnic identity in culturally
divided societies it is a component of the identity differences that can be
manipulated by the leaders of countries, groups, and religions for their
own purposes. In the extreme, the resulting tensions have escalated into
violence and war. The wars which have ravaged former Yugoslavia,
Nigeria, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia provide examples of
this unfortunate phenomenon.
I. NON-SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The principle of separation of church and State in the United States
traces back to the Bill of Rights itself. Namely, the disestablishment
clause of the First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. ,." Disestablishment of course does not mean in reality
an entire separation of religion from politics and policy. Constitutional
affirmations of the separation of church and State where they appear in
European countries seem to mean only the absence of an established re-
ligion, not an absence of considerable State involvement in the religious
sphere. The meaning of that involvement for the human rights of minor-
ity religions and what to do about violations of those rights provides the
leitmotifs for Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in
Eastern Europe.'5
12. See RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 4; RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 4.
13. John Witte, Jr., Introduction to RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPEC-
TIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at xvii, xx.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. The book originated in a series of Pew-financed conferences organized through the
Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights. Conference proceedings were
edited into the book under review by Peter Danchin and Elizabeth Cole. Between 1995 and
1999, Dr. Cole coordinated the program on Religion, Human Rights and Religious Freedom at
the Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights. As a member of the executive
committee of the Columbia University Center for the study of Human Rights, the author of
this Book Review attended several of the Pew-financed conferences which formed the basis of
Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe.
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Michigan Journal of International Law
Across Europe, to varying degrees, as this book highlights, States ac-
tively engage with and support religions, and also discriminate among
them with respect to support and degrees of recognition and freedom.
The effects of nonseparation in Europe seem paradoxical. Countries with
established churches to the North, for example the United Kingdom's
Anglican Church and Scandinavia's Lutheran Church, by and large
manifest fewer violations of religious freedom and equality than do the
countries without established churches in much of the rest of Europe,
including those proclaiming the separation of church and State. 
6
II. INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP RIGHTS
Human rights to freedom of religion and belief in Europe are often
qualified to the effect that States may restrict the behavior of religious
associations and their members "in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."'7 Interpretations by the European Court
of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee formed under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Tad Stah-
nke notes in the book under review, support a narrow reading of the
grounds for possible exceptions to religious freedom. 8 Accordingly,
David Little, in his wide-ranging overview of relevant theory, cautions
that hate speech, permissible in the United States, may be prohibited un-
der article 20 of the ICCPR.' 9 Specifically, article 20 declares that "[a]ny
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incite-
ment to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."20
How should the law reconcile the rights of religious groups with
those of individuals as members within the groups? Little and Danchin
both point to article 27 of the ICCPR as key to the blending of individual
16. See generally FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT, supra note
10, at 259-413 (providing a State by State examination of the state of religious freedom in
Europe); DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001 [here-
inafter COUNTRY REPORTS], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/200 1.
17. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 9(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at
230; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18(3),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
18. See Tad Stahnke, Equality and Religious Preferences: Theoretical, International
and Religious Perspectives, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 106-09.
19. See David Little, Religious Minorities and Religious Freedom: An Overview, in
PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note
1, at 36-37.
20. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 20, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
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and group rights.21 Article 27, spelling out the right of an individual to
cultural self-determination together with others in their ethnic, religious,
or linguistic minority group, states "[i]n those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic majorities exist, persons belonging to such minori-
ties shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, or to use their own language. 22 By balancing the free choice of
individuals to join and leave religious groups with the right to share faith
with others in their group, Little and Danchin reason, international law
balances group and individual rights.2 3 Rights of religious groups, Johan
van der Vyver points out, do not extend into a collective right of the
24
groups to secede from the States within which they find themselves.
III. MUCH FREER, THOUGH WITHIN LIMITS
The end of the Cold War in 1989 "liberated" religions in Eastern
Europe from Communist restraints. It opened up new possibilities for
minority religions. Compared with the Nazi and Communist eras,
Europe today, East and West, harbors unprecedented freedom of religion
and conscience. This general freedom has raised intergroup and interre-
ligious tensions and competition to the surface. These tensions played a
detrimental role in destabilizing the former Yugoslavia and have pre-
vented a fully realized freedom of religion and belief even in the
peaceful, consolidated democracies of Western and Eastern Europe (ex-
cluding the less free, newly independent States of the former Soviet
Union).
Balizs Schanda describes the relative freedom for minorities in
Hungary, alongside its main churches: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reform.
According to a more recent report, the government provided subsidies to
as many as ninety religious groups in 2001 compared with seventy-six in
2000.26 The report cites some infringements on religious freedom and
nondiscrimination, but these violations are well within the range for
Western Europe. Moreover, the Hungarian Parliament has introduced tax
21. See Peter G. Danchin, Introduction to PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELI-
GIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 13; Little, supra note 19, at 37.
22. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 22, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
23. See Danchin, supra note 21, at 13; Little, supra note 19, at 37.
24. See Johan van der Vyver, Self-Determination and the Right to Secession of Reli-
gious Minorities Under International Law, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 267-68.
25. See Balzs Schanda, Protection of Minority Religions in Hungary: A Comparative
Analysis, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 1, at 345-62.
26. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 16.
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deductions, but only for contributions to fourteen of the more than one
hundred recognized religions.
Several chapters in Protecting the Human Rights of Religious
Minorities in Eastern Europe pass over extremist manifestations of anti-
Semitism in the countries they cover, including Schanda's chapter on
Hungary. The Commission Against Racism of the Council of Europe has
criticized Hungary for "blatant anti-Semitism in some media, in
Parliament, and in society."" Acquiescence or even involvement in anti-
Semitic action on the part of some churches merits a closer examination.
As Serhii Plokhy writes in his chapter on Ukraine and Russia, the
relative freedom of religion in Ukraine compared with its neighbor Rus-
sia is connected to the absence in the Ukraine of a predominant single
church, such as the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)." Rather, in the
Ukraine there is a plurality of three contending Orthodox churches, of
which Plokhy mentions the two largest, in addition to the Catholic,
Greek-Rite, Uniate Church. 9 This diversity contributes to the relative
freedom of other, non-Orthodox minority religions in the Ukraine.
Bulgaria's main church is Orthodox. Krassimir Kanev, the very ac-
tive Helsinki Watch's founder and chair in Bulgaria, refers to some
successful efforts before Bulgarian courts and the European Court of
Human Rights to limit State interference with religion under the still ex-
tant but partially neutralized, communist-era Denominations Act of
1949.30 The treatment of the Turkish minority and Islamic religious ac-
tivities leaves them much freer than they were under the coercively
assimilationist Bulgarian communist regime. At this writing, the 1949
law is being replaced by a more rights-oriented one.
The situation in Russia broadly resembles that in Bulgaria, with a
predominant church, the ROC. The 1997 Law on Freedom of Con-
science and Religion, passed under great pressure from the ROC
Patriarchate, replaced a liberal 1990 law. Plokhy says,
[t]he introduction of the new law initiated a campaign of legal
and administrative discrimination against non-Orthodox
churches and Orthodox rivals of the Moscow Patriarchate, and it
is the Russian Orthodox bishops and clergy who have been try-
ing to influence local authorities ... to implement the new law
27. Id.
28. See Serhii Plokhy, State Politics and Religious Pluralism in Russia and Ukraine: A
Comparative Perspective, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 297-315
29. See id. at 298.
30. See Krassimir Kanev, Law and Politics Toward the Muslims in Bulgaria, in PRO-
TECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1,
at 339-40.
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in such a way as to make life most difficult for the minority
churches and religious groups."
The ROC's "amalgam of nationalism and religion" is drawn on by the
authorities to bolster their legitimacy.
Like the Western European provisions mentioned below, one should
add that the 1997 law violates equality provisions of the 1993 Constitu-
tion by setting up three levels of religions' status, with the ROC at the
top with respect to political influence.3 Specifically, the 1997 law recog-
nizes "the special role of the Orthodoxy in the history of Russia.' 34 It
expresses respect for "Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other
religions" as "an integral part of the heritage of the peoples of Russia."35
The law reduced to a third, unfree level those religious groups, including
Christian churches, that could not prove fifteen years existence in Russia
as of October 1, 1997.36 To them, the law denied the right to own prop-
erty, publish, educate, distribute literature, create mass media, maintain
seminaries, and have access to public institutions, until they have reregis-
tered every year up to the proven fifteen years of their existence.37 New
associations created after October 1, 1997, when the law went into ef-
fect, had to exist fifteen years in Russia before registration is possible.38
To expand on Plokhy's account, one should add that lawyer-
advocates like Galina Krylova and Ekaterina Smyslova and their
supporters have gained some small recent victories for religious freedom
in Russia. For example, with respect to the fifteen year requirement for
registration, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, on
November 23, 1999, in a case brought by a congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses in Yaroslavl, ruled that the fifteen year requirement does not
apply to religious organizations that had registered before the law's
effective date.3 9 To the extent that the Court's decision is respected, only
31. See Plokhy, supra note 28, at 299.
32. See id. at 299-301.
33. See KONST. RF (1993) art. 14, translated in CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIS COUNTRIES 421 (William E. Butler ed., 1999).
34. Federal Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations, trans-
lated in RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS 117 (William E. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds., 1998).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 124, 125.
37. See id. at 130-34; see also Plokhy, supra note 28, at 299.
38. Federal Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations, supra
note 34, at 124, 125.
39. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations (Nov.' 23, 1999), http://www.jw-russia.org/eng/other/
99nov23ConstCourt.htm.
Spring 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
religious organizations which first registered after the 1997 law's
enactment face a fifteen year waiting period.40
Additionally, on February 7, 2002 the Constitutional Court annulled
borough and city court orders to liquidate the Moscow office of the Sal-
vation Army. 4' This new ruling held that once a religious organization is
registered, subsequent changes in registration procedures under the 1997
law may not bar reregistration of previously registered organizations
without other than formal grounds. Moreover, local courts sometimes
rebuff attempts by the authorities to shut down religious communities
such as Lutherans, Hare Krishnas, Baptists, Pentacostalists, and Catho-
lics. 43 For example, Jehovah's Witnesses' right to function has been up
upheld by an Orel Court.4"
However, the ROC wins victories of its own, too. Patriarch Alexy
cited alleged proselytizing by the Catholic Church as grounds for an es-
trangement that ruled out a visit by the Pope. Any hopes for such a visit
have been further postponed after Rome upgraded to dioceses four apos-
tolic administrations in Russia. In response, the Russian government
revoked the reentry visas of foreign Catholic priests seeking to return to
their congregations in Russia. Lawrence Uzzell, then director of the
Keston Institute in Oxford, U.K., observed that "Russian nationalists like
to depict Roman Catholicism as an almost completely novel presence in
Russia, introduced by 'proselytizing' clergy from the West only after the
collapse of the Soviet Union ... . In reality, the Catholic Church's
presence in Russia dates back into tsarist times, considerably more than
a century ago. 6 It dates even further back than that in Western Russia.
The ROC also enjoys the recent cooperation of the State with respect
to the introduction of Orthodox religious education into public schools. 7
The focus is on "Orthodox morality." Apparently that morality does not
40. Id.; see also Peter Juviler, Political Community and Human Rights in Postcommu-
nist Russia, in HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW REALITIES 115, 129-30 (Adamantia
Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 2000).
41. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Moscow Division of
the Salvation Army (Feb. 7, 2002), http://stetson.edu/-psteeves/relnews/0202f.html.
42. Id.; see also Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Landmark Constitutional Court Decision
Vindicates Salvation Army, KESTON NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 4, 2002, http://www.keston.org.
43. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 16 (stating that "[in] some cases, religious organiza-
tions successfully enlisted the assistance of the judiciary to overcome bureaucratic resistance
to their reregistration").
44. Id.
45. Lawrence Uzzell, Russia's Growing Religious Repression, http://www.
whitefieldsintl.com/news2.html.
46. See CHRISTEL LANE, CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION: A SOCIOLOGI-
CAL STUDY (1978); HUGH SETON-WATSON, THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 1801-1917, at 215 (1967).
47. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 16 (stating that "the Russian Orthodox Church has
made special arrangements with government agencies to conduct religious education and to
provide spiritual counseling").
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include taking a stand against violent manifestations of religious and
racial bigotry directed toward synagogues and burial grounds, sexual
minorities, dark-skinned residents (from the Caucasus and adjacent re-
gions), and some of the black foreigners in Russia. Nongovernmental
organizations continue to report such violations."8 One chapter of Pro-
tecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe
does address Jewish-gentile relations. Specifically, Stanislaw Krajewski
reflects on gains from dialogue between ecumenical Poles and a tiny
Jewish remnant of the Holocaust and the anti-Zionist campaign of
1968. 49 While in Cracow, this writer was similarly struck by the dedi-
cated non-Jewish Polish leadership of Jewish studies at Jagelonian
University and the Jewish Cultural Center in Cracow.
IV. "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS"?
Peter Danchin shares Cole Durham's opinion that violations of the
rights of religious minorities places them and their adversaries on
opposite sides of what Samuel Huntington calls "cultural fault lines" in
the global "clash of civilizations."5° Here the fault line divides western
Christian civilization and eastern Orthodoxy and Islam. In an endnote,
however, Danchin cites Amartya Sen's argument "that Huntington's
thesis on the clash of civilizations provides inadequate recognition of the
heterogeneities within each culture and does not survive historical
scrutiny."'" Indeed, the Danchin-Cole book contains evidence of
widespread clashes between "belief groups" of shared ethnicity and
ethnic groups of shared religion, within western Christianity.
Timothy Byrnes delves into the ethnic divisions between Catholics,
for example in Romania's Transylvania region, where Hungarian Catho-
lics cleave to the Roman Catholic Church while the Romanians, a
minority in the region, worship in the Greek (Eastern Rite) Catholic
48. See, e.g., 10 EAST-WEST CHURCH & MINISTRY REP. Nos. 1-2 (2002) (discussing
religious education); Moscow HELSINKI GROUP, HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIAN REGIONS: RE-
PORT 2001 (I. Sergeeva et al. eds., 2002) (discussing bigotry and xenophobia), available at
http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/Russia/Report%202001/Section%204.pdf; UNION OF COUNCILS
FOR JEWS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, ANTI-SEMITISM, XENOPHOBIA AND RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION IN RUSSIA'S REGIONS (2001), available at http://www.fsumonitor.com
russiabook200l/RussianReport200 .html.
49. See Stanislaw Krajewski, Catholic-Jewish Dialogue in Poland: A Difficult Road to
Tolerance, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 1, at 490-507.
50. See Danchin, supra note 21, at 2-3.
51. Id. at 24 n.8.
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Church." Rome does not mitigate the Hungarian-Romanian estrange-
ment in Transylvania any more than it does among the divided flocks of
Roman Catholic Slovaks and Roman Catholic Hungarians in Slovakia. 3
Byrnes wonders whether interchurch diplomacy counts more for Rome
than does intra-Catholic rapprochement.
Two- or three-tiered systems of religious rights exist on both sides of
the East-West divide. These systems favor "traditional" religion or relig-
ions, followed sometimes by a second level of traditional but not quite so
privileged religions, and a third level of least privileged religions de-
prived of State benefits, and experiencing a variety of limitations. In the
West, for example, Little mentions privileges of main churches in Aus-
tria under Austria's new law of 1997.54
Although not identical with Russia's law, Austria's similarly sets up
three categories of religious organizations: "religious societies," "religious
confessional communities," and "associations."" "Religious societies"
benefit the most from State patronage, including the reception of religious
taxes. They also may conduct religious education in schools. The nine
"confessional communities" must have at least three hundred members.
Many associations are smaller than that. Recognition as a top-ranked "re-
ligious society" requires a twenty year waiting period, at least ten of them
as a "confessional community" and membership equal to at least 0.2
percent of the national population, a requirement met only by Jehovah's
Witnesses. The Jehovah's Witnesses have sued in both the Austrian
courts and the European Court of Human Rights to have the ten year rule
declared unconstitutional.56
Rosa Maria Martinez de Codes surveys the "concordat tradition" of
church-State agreements in Spain and elsewhere. 7 Spain's constitution
declares it to be a secular State. There is no State religion. Rosa Maria
Martinez de Codes reports that Spain is committed to equality regardless
52. See Timothy Byrnes, The Catholic Church in Post-Communist Europe, in PROTECT-
ING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at
467-74.
53. Id. at 467,478.
54. See Little, supra note 19, at 47.
55. See DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT OF 2002 [here-
inafter 2002 IRF REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5544.htm; see
also Carolyn Wah, European Parliamentary Enquete Commissions: Justifications of a Two-
Tiered System of Religious Freedoms, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note I, at 379.
56. See 2002 IRF REPORT, supra note 55.
57. See Rosa Maria Martfnez de Codes, The Contemporary Form of the Relationship
Between Religious Minorities and the State in Spain, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 389-407.
58. C.E. art. 16 (1978); see also Martinez de Codes, supra note 57, at 397.
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of religious beliefs.59 But Martfnez's account does not quite convey the
Spanish version of a three-tiered system. Catholicism enjoys closest rela-
tions with the government. Jews, Muslims, and Protestants have official
status, and are pressing for changes in their agreements with the State to
give them privileges comparable to those enjoyed by the Catholic
Church. These privileges would include public financing through a vol-
untary income tax deduction, now credited only to the Catholic Church;
greater gift tax exemptions and media access; and fewer barriers to open-
ing new temples, churches, and mosques. Some religions, including the
Church of Scientology, have neither agreements with the government nor
the recognition accorded other faiths.'
V. RELATING TO CULTS
Proselytizing is a human right, albeit a controversial one. The
adversaries of minority religions dub them "sects" and "cults." Eileen
Barker suggests "new religions" as a less invidious appellation. 6' The
"administrative discrimination" directed against "sects" and "cults" in
Western Europe is based on ill-documented and biased parliamentary
reports, and supported by various secularist and anti-new religion
partisans. This discrimination is described in some detail by Barker on
Eastern as well as Western Europe,62 Evelyn Wah on Germany and
beyond,63 Willy Fautr6 on Belgium,' and David Little in his overview on
religious freedom.65 The biases reflected in the reports on cults, and
nurtured by them, contribute to the inequities associated with the two- or
three-tiered systems scattered across Europe. Barker concludes "[w]hen
national identity becomes associated exclusively with a particular
religion, and other beliefs are treated not as alternative religions
contributing to the richness of a nation's culture but as treacherous
ideologies, we are likely to see prejudice, discrimination, and, possibly,
bloodshed."' Opposition to minority religions grows out of intergroup
competition and crises of identity. "Pushed into a corner from all sides
59. See Martinez de Codes, supra note 57, at 397.
60. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 16.
61. See Eileen Barker, The Protection of Minority Religions in Eastern Europe, in PRO-
TECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1,
at 58-59.
62. Barker, supra note 61.
63. Wah, supra note 55.
64. Willy Fautr6, The Protection of Religious Minorities in Belgium: A Western Euro-
pean Perspective, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 1, at 429.
65. Little, supra note 19.
66. See Barker, supra note 61, at 82.
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•.. "' Baker writes, "it is not surprising that the national churches should
be fighting back.'
The protection of communal or collective identities does not legiti-
mize discrimination or attempts by some States of Europe to ban
proselytizing. There were no accepted international defenses of Greece's
prosecutions for proselytizing.68 The 1975 Greek Constitution, passed
after the military junta collapsed, states in article 3 that "the prevailing
religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ.,
69
The Greek Orthodox Church (GOC) receives State tax-supported fund-
ing for clerical salaries and church building maintenance. All other
"known" (that is, not recently imported) religions have liberty, but no
subsidies. As a check on them and newcomers, proselytism is banned by
the Constitution'0 and in the law of "Necessity Acts" dating back to
1938-39. 71 Article 16 declares that the State must ensure the "develop-
ment of the national and religious consciousness.' Greece does not get
a separate chapter in Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minori-
ties in Eastern Europe. However, Danchin and Forman report recent
gains in freedom to proselytize in Greece promoted by decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights.73 More recently, the government's
elimination of "religion" from identity cards marks a further step away
from a virtual religious monopoly for the Orthodox Church.74 This action
reflects the growing acceptance of pluralism in Greece, a decoupling of
religion from national identity.
The identification of religion and nationality in Greece is epitomized
in Eileen Barker's conversation in Armenia.
My landlady in Yerevan is a well-educated woman and one of
the kindest people I know . . . . One evening I returned home
slightly later than usual and she asked me where I had been. "To
the Hare Krishna temple," I responded. "Oh--they're not Arme-
nians," she told me . . . . "Look," I said "they have all lived in
Yerevan all their lives-they don't speak any other language
than Armenian-and their names all end in -ian." "They're not
67. Id. at 74.
68. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 418 (1994); see also Peter G.
Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 200-02.
69. Greece Const. art. 13, § 2, cl. 1 (1995).
70. Greece Const. art. 3, § 1, cl. 3.
71. See John Anderson, The Treatment of Religious Minorities in South-Eastern
Europe: Greece and Bulgaria Compared, 30 RELIGION, ST. & Soc'y 9 (2002).
72. Greece Const. art. 16, § 2, cl. 2.
73. See Danchin & Forman, supra note 68, at 200-06, 209-10.
74. 2002 IRF REPORT, supra note 55.
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Armenian. They're not Christian." "Come off it," I countered,
"Your children aren't Christian-they're atheists-aren't they
Armenian?" "Yes of course they are," she replied indignantly,
"they're Christian Atheists."
75
VI. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The regional focus on Europe in the Danchin-Cole book permits
wide-ranging comparisons of church-State relations across and within
cultural "fault lines." Even in democratic Western Europe, as well as in
emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, religions and human rights
advocates are challenged by a persistent favoritism shown to "tradi-
tional" religions at the expense of the others and by the limits of human
rights enforcement. Adding to legacies of competition and differences
among religions are the further tensions growing out of crises in the
Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere.
Various recent symposia, including the book under review, present
evidence of church-State complicity in discrimination against minority
religions. Even as religions contribute to discrimination and other viola-
tions of religious rights, they also carry some of the keys to lessening
and resolving those tensions. Tomdis F61desi calls for "dialogue between
the churches. . with persons of other faiths, and with no faith, to realize
the values which exist on both sides to the benefit of the individual and
society."76 John Pobee's reflections from Africa could apply to Europe.
He concludes that
the quest for human rights must search for models of mission
which from start to finish, respect and foster human dignity ....
righteousness and justice, freedom, reconciliation, and peace.
... This means a rejection of the temptation to define the other
only in one's own terms .... [r]eligious human rights will flour-
ish only in a culture of religious pluralism ......
What is to be done while waiting for dialogue to bear fruit? Given
the interreligious tensions still troubling Europe, the separation of church
and State, in leaving churches largely to their own devices, would likely
75. Barker, supra note 61, at 74.
76. Toms F61desi, The Main Problems of Religious Freedom in Eastern Europe, in
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at
261.
77. See John S. Pobee, Africa's Search for Religious Human Rights Through Returning
to Wells of Living Water, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 415.
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fuel rather than calm disputes. Even Willy Fautr6, incensed though he is
at the defamations and harassment of "sects," sees no workable possibil-
ity of separation in the U.S. sense.7" Rather, he urges more objective
reporting on new religions. Also, he joins others who suggest more equi-
table approaches to State involvement with religion: designating a
portion of one's income tax payment for a specific religion should be
either voluntary, naming a religion, or automatically credited to all relig-
ions, including minorities, in proportion to their membership. The
various religions all would benefit from tax exemptions for donations.
Tad Stahnke, Director of Research at the United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom, concludes that the differential
treatment of religions does not constitute a violation of human rights as
long as the assistance is proportional to size and services.79 Support to
religious organizations can take many forms. Funding for clergy, repairs,
and schools should be proportional to the number of adherents. The
teaching of religion in schools should be allowed on a nondiscriminatory
and voluntary basis. Taxation for religious organizations should be vol-
untary and in proportion to numbers of adherents, and to services to the
general population. Special Rapporteur Krishnaswami suggested in 1959
similar possibilities of equitable support." I would add that recent waves
of migration into and among European countries have changed demo-
graphic profiles of religion and ethnicity. Proportionality of support now
would require a corresponding updating in demographic reporting, espe-
cially in the countries where tiered systems of national churches and
others less privileged remain.
Danchin, Forman, Gunn, and Little urge the importance of a vigor-
ous international protection of religious human rights by the European
Court of Human Rights, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe (OSCE), and nongovernmental organizations.8' Both Little and
Danchin argue for the multilateral protection of human rights, in prefer-
ence to unilateral protection such as attempted by the United States
under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. The OSCE is
the descendant of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which sparked civil soci-
ety activity and helped prepare countries, or at least some of their elites,
78. See Fautrd, supra note 64.
79. See Stahnke, supra note 18, at 114-15.
80. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 8, at 74.
81. See PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 1, at 131, 192, 222, 33.
82. See Peter G. Danchin, External Monitoring and the International Protection of
Freedom of Religion or Belief, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 51-52; Little, supra note 19, at 177; see also Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6431 (2003).
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for the move toward a more open society. 3 T. Jeremy Gunn depicts an
OSCE that is now wide ranging, its networking considerable.M But the
OSCE's conclusions are declarative and admonishing, rather than judi-
cial and substantive s5 Its impact is hard to gauge, but is likely to further
the cause of human rights to freedom of religion and belief.86 That is true
also of the U.N. system of monitoring through its treaty-based and Char-
ter-based organizations. Both the need for and the promise of advocacy
provide the basic lesson from the experience of Europe and elsewhere
that, in Donald Shriver's words, "[r]eligion and human rights need each
other."87
83. See T. Jeremy Gunn, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
and the Rights of Religion or Belief, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MI-
NORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 222-25.
84. Id. at 240-43.
85. Id. at 225-26.
86. See id. at 243.
87. Shriver, supra note 1, at 519.
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